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The German government claims to pursue a restrictive arms export policy. Indeed, there are ample 
laws, provisions and international agreements for regulating German arms export policy. However, 
a review of 30 years of German arms export policy reveals an alarming picture. Although licences 
granted for arms exports to so-called third countries, which are neither part of the EU or NATO, nor 
equivalent states (Australia, Japan, New Zealand, and Switzerland), are supposed to be isolated cas-
es with specific justifications, they have become the rule. In the past ten years alone, up to 60 per cent 
of German weapons of war and other military equipment has repeatedly been exported to third coun-
tries. Not every arms export to third countries is problematic. It is, however, if those third countries 
violate the norms and rules of international humanitarian law by waging wars and indiscriminately 
bombing civilian targets such as schools and hospitals.
The present PRIF report takes a look at 30 years of German arms export policy. It shows that all 
German governments have supplied weapons of war and other military equipment to problematic 
third countries, but also to NATO partners such as Turkey. The time frame was chosen deliberately, 
since hopes were high after 1990 that with the peace dividend after the end of the Cold War a con-
version of arms manufacturers would take place as a matter of industrial policy, that arms control 
and disarmament would become more important and the demand for arms exports would decrease 
both nationally and internationally. 30 years later, an opposite trend is now apparent in the form of 
growing defence and military expenditures and a high demand also for German weapons of war and 
military equipment. The regulation of arms exports remains a difficult endeavour, since states insist 
on their right to self-defence, guaranteed by Article 51 of the UN Charter. On the other hand, since the 
1990s efforts have been and are being made at the European and international level to regulate arms 
transfers in accordance with existing provisions of international law and human rights.
A review of 30 years of German arms export policy shows that German arms export control mean-
while consists of a variety of rules, norms and procedures. These have been modified and adapted 
over the decades and also supplemented by European rules such as the EU Common Position on 
arms export control as well as international treaties such as the international Arms Trade Treaty 
(ATT). Despite this dense but also complicated web of norms, weapons of war and military equip-
ment ended up in problematic third countries, not least because sanctioning powers don’t exist at 
the European and international level and are very limited in Germany, too. If the eight criteria of the EU 
Common Position are used as a benchmark for assessing 30 years of German arms export policy, it 
becomes clear that Germany has often violated these criteria.
Germany grants licences and exports weapons of war and military equipment to third countries 
that violate international humanitarian law in armed conflicts, but also to countries that severely 
violate the human rights of their citizens and to regions of tensions. Especially in these cases, Ger-
man arms exports contribute to fuelling the arms dynamics and thus increase the risk that existing 
conflicts escalate and turn violent. The countries of the MENA (Middle East and North Africa) region 
remain major recipients of German arms exports, but South Asia and South America also have been 
and still are recipient countries of German military equipment. Since 2015, a war has been raging in 
Yemen, in which it is particularly the civilian population that is suffering. The air strikes against civil-
ian targets by members of the Yemen war coalition and the naval blockades violate core criteria of 
international humanitarian law, such as those of proportionality and distinction between civilians and 
combatants. Some of the weapons of war and military equipment used in the Yemen conflict come 
from Germany.
In the past, Germany has repeatedly exported small arms and light weapons to third countries, 
including from surplus stockpiles resulting from the downsizing of the Bundeswehr and the closure 
of the national people’s army (NVA) of the former German Democratic Republic (GDR). In July 2019, 
in revising the Political Principles for the Export of Weapons of war and other Military Equipment, the 
German government decided in principle to no longer grant licences for small arms and light weap-
ons to be exported to third countries. The examples of the study document how quickly arms exports 
and equipment aid such as small arms and light weapons enter into illegal circulation and end up 
on the black market, and what long-term consequences the earlier generous granting of production 
licences for manufacturing small arms in third countries continues to have today. Worldwide, more 
small arms and light weapons are still being produced than are currently being destroyed. A serious 
regulatory gap remains with respect to ammunition, as weapons only turn deadly once they are load-
ed with ammunition. The revised Political Principles of July 2019 have so far disregarded the subject 
of ammunition.
In order to turn the existing web of norms into a more effective legal basis, the members of the 
German parliament should draw up and adopt an arms export control law. Already in the run-up to the 
federal election year 2021, several parliamentary groups in the German parliament have spoken out in 
favour of such an arms export control law. The idea itself is not new and was already pursued in the 
previous legislative period of the Grand Coalition by the Minister for Economic Affairs, Sigmar Gabri-
el. A consultation process between different stakeholders from politics, business, academia and civil 
society was organised at the time. In the meantime, legal experts have prepared drafts of what such 
an arms export control law could look like. Such a law could create a basis for judicial review from the 
patchwork of laws and political obligations. Together with the right of associations such as NGOs to 
take legal action, this would make decisions on arms export control subject to judicial accountability, 
in addition to the still limited possibilities of parliamentary scrutiny.
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GERMAN ARMS EXPORTS TO THE WORLD? 1
1. IntroduCtIon1
The German government claims to pursue a restrictive arms export policy.2 There are sufficient crite-
ria for regulating arms export policies, for example the Political Principles for the Export of Weapons 
of war and other Military Equipment, the Common Position of the European Union on the control of 
exports of military technology and equipment and the international Arms Trade Treaty (ATT). At their 
core, they all contain norms and rules which deny arms exports when the recipient country seriously 
violates international humanitarian law or human rights, for instance. Nevertheless, when decisions 
on licences of German arms exports are taken in practice, there is a yawning gap between the norma-
tive claim and political practice. The PRIF-report looks at 30 years of licensing practice for German 
arms exports and uses case examples to show that since the end of the Cold War after 1990 all gov-
ernment parties continued to grant licences for exporting German weapons of war and other military 
equipment to problematic third countries.3
While there is a legal basis for a restrictive regulation of German arms exports, it remains insuf-
ficient. On the one hand, this is due to the fact that the Political Principles are not legally binding 
and often contain soft provisions which make exceptions possible. On the other hand, there is no 
sanctioning authority, including at the European level, to enforce the eight criteria of the EU Com-
mon Position by legal action, for instance if arms export licences to problematic third countries are 
granted. In Germany, in contrast to other countries of the European Union, there is also no right to 
bring representative actions in the area of arms export policy, which does exist in other areas, such 
as environmental protection.
Germany’s arms export practice also demonstrates that, despite the thicket of national, Europe-
an and international regulations, there are gaps which allow German companies to found subsidiary 
companies abroad or transfer technology and know-how, which in turn enables third countries to 
manufacture and employ weapons of war. These gaps can ultimately only be filled by an arms export 
control law. Several parties, including the Greens (Bündnis 90/Die Grünen), the Social-Democratic 
Party (SPD) and the Left Party (DIE LINKE) have come out in favour of such a law by now, one year be-
fore the German parliamentary elections. The present PRIF report takes stock by reviewing 30 years 
of German arms export policy. The time frame was chosen deliberately, since hopes were high after 
1990 that with the peace dividend after the end of the Cold War a conversion of arms manufacturers 
would take place as a matter of industrial policy that arms control and disarmament would become 
more important and the demand for arms exports would decrease both nationally and internation-
ally. 30 years later, an opposite trend is now apparent in the form of growing defence and military 
expenditures and a high demand also for German weapons of war and military equipment. The regu-
lation of arms exports remains a difficult endeavour, since states insist on their right to self-defence, 
1   This report was published in an earlier German version, as a study by Greenpeace/Wisotzki (2020).
2   The Greenpeace study was supported through scientific research and collaboration by Lara Bardelle, Viola Niemack, 
Nicolas Schiller and Lisa Waldheim.
3   Third countries are those countries that are neither members of the European Union or NATO nor considered politi-
cally equivalent to them, such as Australia, Japan, New Zealand or Switzerland.
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guaranteed by Article 51 of the UN Charter. On the other hand, since the 1990s efforts have been and 
are being made at the European and international level to regulate arms transfers in accordance with 
existing norms and provisions of international law and human rights.
Observations based on individual case studies covering this long period of 30 years yield a dis-
parate picture. On the one hand, Germany has shown a strong commitment to conventional arms 
(export) control at both the European and the international level; on the other hand, the case stud-
ies show that all German federal governments have granted a number of problematic arms export 
licences, in particular to third countries which are neither part of the European Union or NATO, nor 
NATO-equivalent countries such as Australia, Japan, New Zealand or Switzerland. The eight criteria 
of the EU Common Position on the control of exports of military technology and equipment serve as a 
basis for the empirical assessment in order to substantiate this thesis. They are summarised for the 
purpose of the analysis, and the chapters of the report are structured such as to give particular atten-
tion to those criteria which potential violations are especially flagrant, as they violate core norms of 
international humanitarian law or of human rights. For numerous third countries, several criteria often 
apply at the same time, for example in the case of developing countries that commit systematic hu-
man rights violations. Arms export policy is such an ambivalent policy field not least because weap-
ons of war and military equipment appear necessary on the one hand, in order to maintain public or-
der and security, but on the other hand, they can also be directly detrimental to human security when 
abused, for instance when state security forces use the supplied arms against their own citizens. 
On the basis of primary sources (government documents/reports on exports of military equip-
ment; parliamentary documents, etc.), media reports and secondary literature, the PRIF report anal-
yses the German arms export policy towards problematic recipient countries. The report focuses 
in particular on arms exports to third countries, but NATO states are also to be included if military 
equipment is used for internal repression and systematic human rights violations, for violations of 
international humanitarian law and for conflict escalation, as in the case of Turkey. Apart from weap-
ons of war and other military equipment, the report also looks at forms of military assistance and the 
sale of decommissioned weapons stockpiles, a practice which became relevant with the end of the 
Cold War and the down-sizing of the military of NATO states and former Warsaw Pact states. This is 
another reason to start the report’s period of analysis in 1990. 
The criteria of the EU Common Position are the basis for assessment in analysing the German 
arms export policy since the 1990s. First, Chapter 2 deals with an overview of the legal basis and the 
decision-making practice in German arms export policy. Chapter 3 concentrates on cases in which 
the German federal governments granted arms export licences despite violations of international 
humanitarian law or human rights. Chapter 4 looks at exemplary cases in which peace, security and 
stability were problematic throughout the entire region of the recipient country. Chapter 5 looks in 
particular at the problem of proliferation and illicit diversion of small arms and light weapons by dis-
cussing Criterion Seven of the EU Common Position based on exemplary cases.
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2. legal baSIS and the deCISIon-makIng praCtICe of german   
 armS export 
Article 26 para. 1 of the German constitution emphasises the peaceful character of the German state. 
One aspect of the constitution’s principle of peace is that actions which may be detrimental to this 
principle are punishable offences. Article 26 para. 2 of the constitution defines the licensing authority 
for German arms exports: weapons intended for warfare may only be exported with the licence of the 
German government, i.e. the federal cabinet. Details of the licensing procedure are to be stipulated in 
a federal law. The War Weapons Control Act (Kriegswaffenkontrollgesetz, KWKG) is commonly con-
sidered to be this implementing law. Article 6 (3) of the KWKG contains first provisions for denying 
the export of weapons of war, e.g. if their export could be used for wars of aggression or if Germany’s 
international legal obligations would be violated if licences were granted.4 In Germany, licences for 
arms exports are usually applied in the form of so-called preliminary inquiries by the arms manufac-
turing company. Often, there are several years between the individual export licence and the actual 
export of the weapons of war. This is why the War Weapons Control Act also provides for the pos-
sibility of revocation, for example if the security situation of the recipient country has significantly 
changed in the meantime.
The Political Principles for the Export of Weapons of war and other Military Equipment state that 
the export of weapons of war to so-called third countries is handled restrictively. Licences for export-
ing weapons of war to such countries are not granted unless “in a specific case, this is exceptionally 
warranted due to particular foreign or security policy interests of the Federal Republic of Germany, 
having due regard to Alliance interests” (Bundesministerium für Wirtschaft und Energie 2019c, Art. 
2: 6). Looking at Germany’s arms export policy in the past, one finds that arms exports towards third 
countries are by no means isolated cases and that the exception of arms exports to third countries 
has long become the rule. In each of the years 2014–2018, over 50 per cent of all individual export 
licences were for third countries, sometimes even 60 per cent (Gemeinsame Konferenz Kirche und 
Entwicklung 2020: 39–40). And yet the first Political Principles for the Export of Weapons of war and 
other Military Equipment from 1971, for example, stipulated that weapons of war were in principle not 
to be exported to non-NATO countries. Since then, the Political Principles have been revised three 
times, most recently in July 2019.5 The former general ban on exporting weapons of war to third 
countries has been replaced by a complicated regime of restricting norms.
German arms export policy is confronted with a variety of international agreements, norms and 
rules. For instance, such normative contexts can be found in international humanitarian law, such as 
the 1949 Geneva Convention, or in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), but also in the 
form of weapons embargoes as imposed by the United Nations or regional organisations. They con-
stitute the international framework of normative order that has constantly been expanded throughout 
4   https://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/krwaffkontrg/KrWaffKontrG.pdf (March 3, 2021).
5   The different versions of the Political Principles are available under http://ruestungsexport-info.de/ruestung-recht/
politische-grundsaetze.html. The Political Principles are only politically binding and, therefore, below the status of 
formal law.
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history, for instance by the 1997 Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention, the 2001 UN Programme of 
Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its 
Aspects (UNPoA), the 2008 Convention on Cluster Munitions or the 2014 Arms Trade Treaty. At the 
European level, the international norms were replaced by regional provisions, for instance the 1998 
EU Code of Conduct, which was converted into the legally binding Common Position on the control of 
exports of military technology and equipment in 2008 (Amtsblatt der Europäischen Union 2008).6 In 
addition, there are two implementing laws at the German level, the War Weapons Control Act (KWKG) 
and the Foreign Trade and Payments Act (AWG), and furthermore the Foreign Trade and Payments 
Ordinance (AWV) as well as the revised and adapted Political Principles on arms exports. Article 26 
para. 2 provides that exports of weapons of war require a licence by the German government; the 
constitution thus differentiates between weapons of war and other military equipment. This also cor-
responds to the separation into the War Weapons Control Act and the Foreign Trade and Payments 
Act (Grebe/Roßner 2013).
In sum, looking at German, European and international rules on arms export control, one can 
speak of a veritable web of norms that is supposed to guide German licensing procedures. In assess-
ing the cases, the present report on German arms export policy takes the EU Common Position for 
the control of exports of military technology and equipment and the eight criteria it is based on as the 
main point of reference. Its criteria are based on the principles and norms of international humani-
tarian law, the Charter of the United Nations or human rights declarations. Even before 1998, most 
of the norms of the EU Common Position were already included in the German Political Principles 
(Wissenschaftliche Dienste Deutscher Bundestag 2018).
 – Criterion One: Respect for international obligations: sanctions adopted by the UN Security 
Council/the EU; agreements on non-proliferation and arms control
 – Criterion Two: Respect for human rights and international humanitarian law
 – Criterion Three: Internal situation in the country of final destination with regard to the existence 
of tensions or armed conflicts
 – Criterion Four: Preservation of regional peace, security and stability
 – Criterion Five: National security of the member states and of territories whose external rela-
tions are the responsibility of a member state; national security of friendly and allied countries
 – Criterion Six: Behaviour of the buyer country with regard to the international community, as 
regards in particular its attitude to terrorism, the nature of its alliances and respect for interna-
tional law
 – Criterion Seven: Existence of a risk that the military technology or equipment will be diverted 
within the buyer country or re-exported under undesirable conditions
 – Criterion Eight: Compatibility of the exports of the military technology and equipment with the 
technical and economic capacity of the recipient country, taking into account the legitimate 
security and defence needs
6   The wording of Art. 29 TEU stipulates that member states shall ensure that their national policies conform to the 
Union positions. In German arms export policy, the rules of the EU Common Position are also reflected in the criteria 
of the Political Principles after their revision in 2000. 
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The German government emphasises that arms exports are not an instrument of economic policy 
and should not be treated like other exports. Export licences are only to be granted after a specif-
ic assessment of each individual case, and decided upon according to foreign and security policy 
considerations.7 In Germany, a distinction is made between exports of weapons of war and of oth-
er military equipment; accordingly, either the Ministry for Economic Affairs takes a decision, based 
on assessments by the country divisions of the Foreign Office and by the Ministry of Defence, or in 
the case of other military equipment, also the Federal Office for Export Control (Bundesausfuhramt, 
BAFA). Particularly contentious or problematic cases of arms exports are decided upon in secret 
meetings of the Federal Security Council (Bundesministerium der Verteidigung 2019).8 The German 
parliament is responsible for parliamentary scrutiny of government action. In matters of arms ex-
ports, the Constitutional Court ruled against a complaint by Bündnis 90/Die Grünen demanding more 
transparency and less secrecy in October 2014. At least, the Economic Committee of the German 
Parliament receives ex-post information about the results of secret arms export policy decisions by 
the Federal Security Council. Question times and inquiries complement the limited opportunities of 
parliamentary scrutiny. Twice a year, the German Ministry for Economic Affairs publishes the official 
figures of licences and actual exports of weapons of war and other military equipment in the report 
on exports of military equipment. Here, too, transparency is limited, as only very general information 
is provided on the recipient states and amounts for which arms export licences were granted. The 
specific military equipment and the manufacturer can usually not be inferred. 
3. reSpeCt for human rIghtS, InternatIonal humanItarIan law   
 and the Internal SItuatIon In the reCIpIent Country 
The eight criteria of the EU Common Position on arms exports constitute the basis for granting li-
cences for German arms exports. Respect for international humanitarian law and human rights in the 
recipient country are combined in Criterion Two of the EU Common Position. Similar provisions can 
also be found in the Political Principles for the Export of Weapons of war and other Military Equip-
ment and in the 2014 Arms Trade Treaty (ATT). Especially during the negotiations on the ATT, Germa-
ny always emphasised the significance of the human rights criterion in the negotiations at the United 
Nations in New York. The User’s Guide for the EU Common Position cites internal repression as an 
example of human rights violations and emphasises that human rights violations need not occur sys-
tematically in a recipient country for the export to be refused.9 Also, in making the export decision, 
particular attention is to be paid to the type of equipment; for instance, armoured personnel carriers 
or communication and surveillance equipment which could be used for repressive purposes are men-
tioned. But human rights violations such as torture, arbitrary executions, enforced disappearances 
of persons or restrictions on fundamental freedoms as set out in relevant human rights agreements 
7   https://www.bmwi.de/Redaktion/DE/Dossier/ruestungsexportkontrolle.html (March 22, 2021).
8   In addition to the Chancellor, the Federal Security Council includes a representative of the Chancellery, the Foreign 
Office, the Ministry of Defence, the Ministry of Economic Affairs, the Ministry of the Interior, the Ministry of Justice 
and Consumer Protection, the Ministry of Finance and the Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development.
9   See https://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/40659/st12189-en19.pdf (March 22, 2021).
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are also referred to (Council of the European Union 2015). Criterion Three of the EU Common Position 
points to the internal situation of the recipient country and the existence of potential armed conflicts 
or domestic tensions in the buyer country. The User’s Guide of the EU Common Position defines these 
as hostilities between different groupings of the recipient country, unrest, violence or the existence 
of private militias. The following examples illustrate that since 1990, the German government has re-
peatedly granted licences for exporting weapons of war and military equipment to recipient countries 
whose authoritarian governments use violence against their own population, commit serious human 
rights violations or are involved in armed conflicts.
3.1 EGYPT
Between 2001 and 2019, Germany granted licences for the export of weapons of war and military 
equipment worth 1.5 billion euros to Egypt.10 In 2019, the military regime was the top recipient among 
third countries. Thyssen Krupp had been granted a licence for exporting a frigate of the MEKO 200 
type, even though the country belongs to the Yemen war coalition and the German government had 
agreed in the coalition treaty in 2018 not to grant any licences for arms exports to members of the 
coalition (Gebauer/Traufetter 2019).
But even before, Egypt was a problematic recipient country in view of the system of internal re-
pression and human rights violations. Already under President Hosni Mubarak, torture and abuse of 
dissidents and opposition members was the order of the day. President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi also uses 
violence against its political opponents, e.g. lethal torture and abuse in prisons. Egypt has joined core 
human rights agreements, but their implementation is poor, which applies especially to the Conven-
tion against Torture. Nevertheless, the country received small arms from Germany, for example in 
2007 and 2009, but also armoured vehicles, parts for tanks and air defence systems (Gemeinsame 
Konferenz Kirche und Entwicklung 2011: 54; 2008: 39).
In 2011, there were mass protests by the Egyptian population against the Mubarak regime, which 
resulted in numerous deaths and injuries. Mubarak ultimately stepped down, whereupon first the mil-
itary and then the Muslim Brotherhood under Mohamed Morsi took power. In 2013, Morsi was ousted 
by the military, which then in turn took over power (Bonn International Center for Conversion 2020a). 
In August 2013, the EU foreign ministers agreed on stopping shipments of military equipment to 
Egypt as a result of the internal situation in Egypt (Der Spiegel 2013). Yet in 2014, eleven EU countries 
granted arms export licences with a total value of more than six billion euros. In 2014, the German 
government granted arms export licences amounting to 22.7 million euros, mainly for submarine 
technology. Egypt’s army had also used the light wheeled tank Fahd against the peaceful protests, 
which was produced in Egypt, but for which parts and components had been supplied from Germany 
until 2012 (Brössler 2013). Egypt’s neighbour Israel expressed concern in 2012 about the licence for 
10  Cf. Campaign against Arms Trade n.d.: EU Arms Export. EU-Waffenexporte, https://www.caat.org.uk/resources/ex-
port-licences-eu/licence.de.html?source=Germany&destination=Egypt (March, 22 2021)..
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two submarines of the HDW shipyard in Kiel, stating that after the overthrow of Hosni Mubarak, the 
country was not a reliable state in the region (Nassauer 2012b; Focus 2012).
3.2 ALGERIA
Between 2001 and 2015, Germany granted licences for exports of weapons of war and military equip-
ment worth nearly two billion euros to Algeria. These were mainly vehicles and tanks, but also war-
ships, explosive devices as well as small arms and ammunition. Since President Abdelaziz Boutef-
lika stepped down in 2019, the internal situation and the human rights record have remained tense; 
military and security forces use violence against protest movements. Between 2013 and 2017, the 
death penalty is said to have been carried out in around 175 cases (Friedrichs 2018). Despite the 
precarious human rights situation, the instability of the country and the tense situation in the entire 
region of North Africa, the Federal Security Council granted licences for various arms projects for 
Algeria in 2011. These applied to armoured transport vehicles and parts for armoured vehicles worth 
217 million euros in 2011 and off-road vehicles and trucks worth more than 500 million euros in 2012 
and 2013 (Bonn International Center for Conversion 2020b). Rheinmetall and MAN were awarded the 
contract to build the armoured transport vehicle Fuchs with their joint venture in Algeria. Mercedes 
Benz focused on the production of trucks and off-road vehicles. ThyssenKrupp Marine Systems re-
quested licences for frigates and training the navy (Handelsblatt 2011). In short: German assistance 
contributed to the large-scale modernisation of the Algerian armed forces (Gemeinsame Konferenz 
Kirche und Entwicklung 2015: 90; 2012). The Algerian arms industry is becoming independent by es-
tablishing its own production capacities with the support of German companies; this trend can be 
identified in many countries of the MENA region (Middle East and North Africa). At the same time, 
by establishing own production capacities these countries can in turn export arms to war zones and 
crisis regions. Algeria has so far not signed the international Arms Trade Treaty and is thus not bound 
to global arms export control standards beyond some general regulations of international law. Since 
2014, Mercedes Benz has been producing off-road vehicles of the BA6G class near Tiaret (Nkala 
2015). Rheinmetall Algerie SPA built 120 armoured transport vehicles of the Fuchs type in each of the 
years 2018 and 2019. In 2019, the Federal Security Council granted a licence for 160 electric drives for 
weapon stations that are to be integrated into the Fuchs armoured transport vehicle (Gebauer 2019). 
In the next ten years, the company intends to produce a total of around 1,000 tanks. 
3.3 BRAZIL 
According to SIPRI, Germany was the most important supplier of military equipment to Brazil be-
tween 2006 and 2019, even ahead of the U.S. and Russia. In 1999, Brazil received patrol boats and 
parts for warships, in 2001 parts for submarines and minesweepers, in 2009 battle tanks, armoured 
vehicles and trucks worth 115.1 million euros. In 2016, Brazil also received submachine guns and 
pistols, among other things (Bonn International Center for Conversion 2020c). There are recurring 
human rights violations in this South American country, such as excessive police violence. Threats, 
attacks and killings of human rights activists and defenders are the order of the day. In a case from 
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the 1990s, Brazilian military police officers killed 111 prisoners while squashing an uprising. In Octo-
ber 1992, there were quarrels in a prison in São Paulo and the police stormed the prison by force of 
arms, even though numerous prisoners declared their peaceful intentions with white cloths. The mil-
itary police were equipped with Heckler & Koch submachine guns of the MP5 type, which had been 
supplied from Germany, as Amnesty International was able to ascertain using the serial numbers 
(Cascais 2014). 
3.4 INDONESIA 
In 2003, pictures of Indonesian warships showed soldiers of the Indonesian army being transported 
to the civil war in Aceh. The warships were units of German origin which had been passed on to In-
donesia as decommissioned weapons from the stockpiles of the former East German military after 
its dissolution; they included landing ships, corvettes and a support vessel. At the time, the German 
government had stated in reply to critical questions from members of the parliamentary opposition 
that the ships were designated solely for protecting the coast and sea routes against piracy and drug 
trafficking. Ten years later, the internal situation in Indonesia had changed so fundamentally that the 
German warships were used in a civil war (Gemeinsame Konferenz Kirche und Entwicklung 2003: 
33). This was also made possible by a supply of new engines which replaced the old ship engines. 
Already from the 1970s onwards, German weapons of war and military equipment had been supplied 
to Indonesia; they were also used in the conflict in East Timor in 1999 (Friedrichs 2013; Gemeinsame 
Konferenz Kirche und Entwicklung 2000: 4). Since the mid-1990s, the German parliament had repeat-
edly debated arms exports to Indonesia. Opposition politicians criticised the decisions of the Federal 
Security Council and referred to the systematic human rights violations of the Indonesian govern-
ment in East Timor (Deutscher Bundestag 1996a; 1996b).
In 2013, the German government granted licences for the shipment of 104 Leopard 2 battle tanks 
and 50 older Marder tanks. Indonesia had first submitted a request in the Netherlands. However, the 
deal failed because of parliamentary concerns regarding the human rights situation in the country 
(Gebauer/Nassauer 2013). The tanks originated from decommissioned stockpiles of the German 
military and had been sold to the German arms industry for resale. Rheinmetall ultimately concluded 
the deal with Indonesia and had previously carried out a technical modernisation of the old tanks 
(Deutscher Bundestag 2012). In Article 4, the EU Common Position provides for consultations if an-
other member state had denied the licence within the preceding three years, as the Netherlands had. 
In addition, in the case of battle tanks to Indonesia, Germany would have had to justify vis-à-vis the 
Netherlands why the licence was granted by Germany although it had previously been denied by the 
Netherlands. However, the EU arms export system and the EU Common Position do not foresee any 
sanctions against its member states (Grebe/Roßner 2013). 
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3.5 QATAR
German weapons of war and military equipment are also supplied to the kingdom of Qatar. Although 
Qatar is a dictatorship in which human rights are frequently violated, supports non-state groups, for 
example in the war in Syria, and is in conflict with Saudi Arabia, Egypt and the United Arab Emirates 
over the issue of cooperation with Iran and Islamist groups, export licences for weapons of war have 
been granted and used, in particular in recent times. Between 2001 and 2012, the sum of licences 
amounted to nearly 60 million euros.11 They included licences for warships, small arms and explosive 
devices. In 2013, the German government granted licences for 673.3 million Euros worth of weapons 
of war and military equipment for Qatar (Gemeinsame Konferenz Kirche und Entwicklung 2015: 57). 
In 2016, Qatar came in at the top of the list of recipient countries of German arms exports, with licenc-
es amounting to 1.66 billion euros (Bundesministerium für Wirtschaft und Energie 2017a). In 2013, 
the German government granted licences for the export of 62 battle tanks of the Leopard 2 type and 
24 armoured howitzers. In 2015, the first tranche was due for export to Qatar. Since 2015, Qatar has 
been involved in the war against Yemen and sent ground forces (Krüger/Mascolo 2015). The Ministry 
for Economic Affairs had even initiated a review due to the changed political situation, but the con-
cerns about industrial claims for compensation apparently carried more weight (Hickmann/Mascolo 
2015). The members of the German parliament critically discussed the planned shipments of tanks 
as a current issue (Deutscher Bundestag 2015d). By 2017, all 62 Leopard 2 tanks had been shipped 
to Qatar (Tillack/Bettoni/Richter 2017). In the summer of 2017, Qatar ordered 24 Eurofighter combat 
jets from the British company BAE Systems; Germany is also involved in the construction of these 
combat jets (Hegmann 2017). In 2020, the Federal Security Council granted a licence for the export 
of a total of 15 anti-aircraft cannon tanks of the Gepard (cheetah) type worth 31.4 million euros (Der 
Spiegel 2020).
3.6 SAUDI ARABIA
German arms exports to Saudi Arabia have a long tradition. Whether it is patrol boats, artillery am-
munition or licences for independent production sites for small arms: over the decades, there has 
been a variety of licences and realised arms exports from Germany to the region’s anchor of stability 
(Gebauer 2015; Welt 2011). This is how nearly all German governments justified the licences granted 
for arms exports to the authoritarian regime. There has also been frequent talk of a strategic balance 
vis-à-vis Iran, even though the MENA region (Middle East and North Africa) is already deemed one of 
the most heavily armed regions of the world, and yet the arms race continues unabated. The Western 
side often presents the argument of using arms exports to equip countries in the war on terror. In the 
case of Saudi Arabia, it became clear after 9/11 and the terror attacks in New York and Washington, 
D.C., that 15 attackers and the strategic head of the terror organisation Al-Qaeda, Osama bin Laden, 
came from Saudi Arabia, as well as financing (Zeit Online 2018). Since 2015, Saudi Arabia has waged 
war against the Huthi militias in Yemen; the victims of the war are also civilians who are injured and 
11  Cf. Aufschrei-Waffenhandel (o.J.): Deutsche Rüstungsexporte nach Katar, https://www.aufschrei-waffenhandel.de/
daten-fakten/empfaengerlaender/katar/ (March 22, 2021).
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killed by air strikes against markets, hospitals, schools or homes and who suffer from the dire con-
sequences of the war such as famines and a lack of medical care (Wisotzki 2018; Deutscher Bunde-
stag 2015b). There are recurring serious human rights violations in Saudi Arabia, such as torture and 
targeted killings of dissidents (Bonn International Center for Conversion 2020f). In 2019, there were 
again mass executions; 37 people ostensibly suspected of terrorism were executed. Women’s rights 
are heavily restricted in the country, and women’s rights campaigners are subject to arbitrary arrests 
(Amnesty International 2019b).
Already in the 1960s, there were close contacts between Germany and Saudi Arabia, with first 
arms deals including artillery, rocket-propelled grenades, small arms and light weapons (Der Spiegel 
1974). In the 1980s, the Saudi kingdom again showed interest in buying German arms. But the Ger-
man government at the time had great difficulties in proving that the desired Leopard battle tanks 
and Gepard anti-aircraft tanks would not be employed against Israel. Moreover, the revised Political 
Principles for the Export of Military Equipment applied since 1982 according to which shipments 
were not to be made to regions of tension (Gemeinsame Konferenz Kirche und Entwicklung 2003: 34; 
1999: 18–20). In 1991, during the period of the second Gulf War, the Kohl government granted licences 
for 36 used armoured reconnaissance vehicles from stockpiles of the West German military (Grässlin 
2013: 57). Saudi Arabia quickly made its way into the top 20 recipient countries of German arms ex-
ports, and after Chancellor Angela Merkel took power in 2005, it even moved into the top ranks of 
buyer countries of German weapons of war. In 2008, the German government granted a production 
licence for the fabrication of G36 assault rifles of the Heckler & Koch Company. In 2011, Saudi armed 
forces supported the Bahraini security forces in their violent suppression of the peaceful protests in 
the country, yet Germany granted licences for arms exports worth nearly 140 million euros to Saudi 
Arabia (Gemeinsame Konferenz Kirche und Entwicklung 2013: 36). In 2012, the kingdom showed 
interest in buying up to 800 Leopard 2 battle tanks. In Germany, this triggered a fierce controversy 
over these potential exports and licences, which were then finally stopped in 2014 by the Minister of 
Economic Affairs, Sigmar Gabriel (SPD) (Zeit Online 2014). On the other hand, weapons of war and 
military equipment amounting to 332 million euros were still exported in 2014/2015, including guided 
missiles and spare parts for combat aircraft as well as parts for artillery ammunition, howitzer am-
munition and mortar ammunition (Der Spiegel 2015). 
Saudi Arabia’s war in Yemen since March 2015 did not change the German government’s attitude 
in granting licences for exports of weapons of war and military equipment to Saudi Arabia (Deutscher 
Bundestag 2017b). Since 2015 alone, the German government has granted licences for arms exports 
with a total value of around 1.5 billion euros (Bonn International Center for Conversion 2020f). The 
air strikes by the Saudi air force against civilian targets in Yemen were also carried out with combat 
aircraft of the Tornado and Eurofighter Typhoon types, which had been supplied by the UK but also in-
clude components from German production (Bundesministerium für Wirtschaft und Energie 2017a). 
In 2017, licences were granted again for another four patrol boats of the Lürssen shipyard and for 110 
trucks of Rheinmetall to be shipped to Saudi Arabia. The military supplier Fritz Werner is authorised to 
sell military equipment and tools amounting to 8.9 million euros to Saudi Arabia. In 2018, Saudi Ara-
bia was still in fourth place of the recipient countries of German arms exports, with licences amount-
ing to 416 million euros (Bundesministerium für Wirtschaft und Energie 2020a).
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Only the murder of Jamal Khashoggi in October 2018 brought a change in the German govern-
ment’s arms export practice, even though there had already been media reports of serious human 
rights violations in Saudi Arabia before and the reporting on the Yemen war also resulted in negative 
headlines (Bales/Mutschler 2019). Investigative research revealed that German weapons of war were 
employed in the Yemen war (Tillack 2019b). This includes the patrol boats supplied so far from the 
Peene shipyard in Wolgast, which were used for naval and port blockades in the Yemen war instead 
of coastal protection once they had arrived in Saudi Arabia (Tillack 2018b). French media reports 
documented that other weapons of war supplied by Germany were also employed in Yemen (Made in 
France 2019). The moratorium on exports imposed in October 2018, which has since been extended, 
is prompting German arms manufacturers to take legal action in order to force a decision. In the case 
of the Rheinmetall Company’s complaint of inactivity, the Frankfurt administrative court decided in 
December 2019 that the chosen mechanism for suspending the validity of the licence for the export 
of trucks is flawed and the German government now has to correct it (Verwaltungsgerichtsbarkeit 
Hessen 2019). Since then, a decision of the German government how to pursue with the court ruling 
is still pending.
In practice, the moratorium on exports has some gaps and is limited in time. For instance, the 
company Lürssen can send spare parts and staff to Saudi Arabia to perform maintenance and repairs 
on patrol boats (Tillack 2019e). In 2019, the Federal Security Council allowed the company KAMAG 
to export technology in order to build tank transporters at the affiliated company Nicolas Industries 
in France and to export them to Saudi Arabia (Nassauer 2019). Moreover, parliamentary inquiries 
document that between January 2019 and June 2020, military equipment was supplied to France, 
from where it was re-exported to Saudi Arabia under licence of the German government, for instance 
electronic systems for military reconnaissance and intelligence worth more than 4.6 million euros 
(Deutscher Bundestag 2020). Yet, air strikes are still being carried out against positions of the Huthis 
in Yemen, as documented by the Yemen Data Project. For July 2020 alone, non-governmental organ-
isations count 215 air strikes that killed 35 civilians (Yemen Data Project 2020).
3.7 TURKEY
In the past, arms exports to Turkey were always justified with Turkey’s NATO membership and also 
with its candidacy for accession to the EU. In the light of domestic developments, but also due to 
the tensions with Greece in the Aegean (including over the Cyprus issue), there would be sufficient 
reasons not to supply this NATO partner with weapons of war and military equipment. The number of 
licence denials document that the German government is indecisive in its political handling of arms 
exports to Turkey. For instance, eleven applications were not granted during the five months between 
November 2016 and March 2017, inter alia with reference to Criterion Two, “respect for human rights 
and international humanitarian law”, and Criterion Three, “internal situation in the country of final des-
tination, as a function of the existence of tensions and armed conflicts” (Bonn International Center 
for Conversion 2020g). These decisions followed the declaration of a state of emergency after the 
failed coup attempt on July 15, 2016.
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Turkey has been in conflict with the PKK (Kurdistan Workers’ Party) for decades; the peace pro-
cess launched in 2013 was stopped in 2015. The Turkish air force has repeatedly carried out air 
attacks against Kurdish territories in order to fight the PKK, which in turn is responsible for terror at-
tacks in Turkey. In south-eastern Turkey, there is recurring military action, and there are also reports 
of serious human rights violations against the Kurdish population. In 2019, after Turkey’s invasion of 
Syria, the German government imposed a temporary suspension of arms exports, whereas in 2018, 
during the Turkish attack on the Syrian region around Afrin, licences continued to be granted; in this 
case, too, alliance commitments were a reason (Bundesministerium für Wirschaft und Energie 2018). 
The Political Principles of July 2019 state that arms exports to NATO partners are generally not to be 
restricted unless a restriction is in order due to specific political reasons in individual cases (Bunde-
sministerium für Wirtschaft und Energie 2019c). The fact that the German government has denied 
licences and rejected applications shows that it does make use of this practice for action, especially 
when the domestic situation changes. On the other hand, licences are granted for exports of weap-
ons of war which are employed against Turkey’s own population or in conflicts, for example in Syria.
Turkey in particular is equipped with a variety of licences and with production capacities of its 
own. Already in the early 1990s, Turkey received speedboats and MEKO frigates from Germany. Var-
ious naval vessels developed in Germany are produced under licence in Turkey, for example subma-
rines, frigates, speedboats and minehunters (Deutscher Bundestag 2010). In 2019, Turkey built the 
first of six submarines under German licence, with substantial involvement of Thyssen Krupp Marine 
Systems. Germany supplied components worth 180 million euros for this. Additionally, Turkey has 
held rights to copy the assault rifles G3 and HK 33 of the company Heckler & Koch and the licence to 
copy the submachine gun MP5 and to manufacture ammunition for assault rifles and submachine 
guns since 1967 and 1998, respectively (Deutscher Bundestag 2010: 15–16). 
In 1999, a first Leopard 2 tank was provided to Turkey for testing purposes; the licence applica-
tions for howitzer parts submitted at the same time were denied by the Federal Security Council 
with reference to potential employment against the Kurds, including on northern Iraqi territory (Ge-
meinsame Konferenz Kirche und Entwicklung 2000: 11–13). In 2004, a debate began in Germany on 
whether 300 to 500 used tanks of the Leopard 2 type from stockpiles of the Germany military should 
be passed on to Turkey (Gemeinsame Konferenz Kirche und Entwicklung 2004: 45–47). At the same 
time, the European Commission gave a positive signal on allowing accession negotiations with Tur-
key for admission to the European Union. Shortly before the end of its term, the Social Democratic 
Party/The Greens coalition government authorised the transfer of 298 surplus tanks of the Leopard 
2 type from German military stockpiles to Turkey (Gemeinsame Konferenz Kirche und Entwicklung 
2006: 72). In 2009, the German government under Chancellor Angela Merkel authorised 41 Leopard 
2A4 tanks for the Turkish armed forces and another 15 tanks as spare part donors (Thumann 2019).
Surplus small arms, for example from decommissioned stockpiles of the former East German 
military, were also sent to Turkey (Stauch 1994). In the early 1990s, Turkey received 250,000 Kalash-
nikov assault rifles, 5,000 machine guns, including several hundred million rounds of ammunition, 
as well as 5,000 rocket-propelled grenades of the RPG 7 type and 250,000 rounds of ammunition 
(Schwarz 1992). In 2000, the German government granted a licence for building an SS109 5.6mm am-
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munition factory, which was executed in 2003 by the company Fritz Werner Industrieausrüstungen. 
Since 2005, the Turkish-Kurdish conflict has intensified and has claimed lives on both sides. In 2008, 
the Turkish army launched a renewed offensive against the Kurds in northern Iraq. An overview of the 
arms shipments between 2000 and 2010 illustrates the regularity and intensity of licences granted 
and exports from Germany (Deutscher Bundestag 2010).
The failed coup attempt of 2016, the harsh crackdown on the Gülen movement and other opposi-
tion politicians as well as President Recep Erdoğan’s declaration in July 2015 that the peace process 
with the Kurds was terminated re-ignited the debate in Germany on arms transfers to Turkey. In 2016, 
Turkey ranked eighth among the most important recipient countries of German military equipment 
(Deutscher Bundestag 2017a). The German government denied a series of licences in that year, but 
it did then grant licences for exporting warships, aircraft, military electronics as well as small arms. 
The licences for bombs, torpedoes and missiles alone amounted to nearly 18 million euros (Bunde-
sministerium für Wirtschaft und Energie 2017b). One year later, there were signs of a significant 
decrease, but licences for exports of weapons of war and military equipment to Turkey were still 
granted (Bundesministerium für Wirtschaft und Energie 2017c). In 2019, during the Turkish advance 
in northern Syria, it became apparent that German Leopard 2A4 tanks were being employed (Thu-
mann 2019). This underlines once again that in a changed political situation, weapons of war and 
military equipment supplied earlier may be employed in armed conflicts, but also against a country’s 
own population (Deutscher Bundestag 2018). The denial of licences amounting to more than 14.58 
million euros as documented in the 2019 report on exports of military equipment with reference to 
the human rights situation or peace and security in the region illustrates that the NATO partner Turkey 
is indeed considered a problematic recipient country (Bundesministerium für Wirtschaft und Energie 
2020).
3.8 UNITED ARAB EMIRATES 
The United Arab Emirates (UAE) are also still one of the most important buyers of German arms ex-
ports, despite also belonging to the Yemen war coalition. Until the end of the 1990s, the UAE played a 
rather small role as a recipient of German arms exports. This changed in 2008; since then, the value 
of German military equipment has regularly been in the triple-digit millions (Bonn International Center 
for Conversion 2020h). The UAE also took part in air strikes against the Huthi militias in Yemen, which 
also repeatedly hit civilian targets. In 2019, the investigative research collective #GermanArms un-
covered that weapons systems with German technology were employed in Yemen, for example tanks 
with MTU engines fitted with German protective armour (ECCHR 2019). In 2017, the German govern-
ment had granted a licence for protective shields for military vehicles of the company Dynamit Nobel 
Defence worth 125.84 million euros (Der Spiegel 2017). The suspension of exports that the German 
government had imposed for Saudi Arabia was not extended to the UAE, even though the UAE also 
directly take part in the Yemen war by carrying out air strikes, including against civilian targets such 
as hospitals, schools or homes. However, the UAE were ultimately still mentioned in the justification 
for the export moratorium for arms exports to Saudi Arabia. Accordingly, the German government 
wanted to push the European partners in joint arms cooperations not to supply any weapons from 
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this production to Saudi Arabia or the UAE (Die Bundesregierung 2019). However, Western states, 
including Germany, had supplied the UAE with weapons of war and military equipment for years. Am-
nesty International reported that the UAE in turn supplied militias in Yemen with armoured vehicles, 
mortar systems, machine guns and pistols (Amnesty International 2019a). 
According to media reports, the UAE are also said to have bypassed the UN arms embargo against 
Libya and supplied General Haftar’s militias with arms (Wisotzki/Mutschler 2020; Tillack 2019c). An 
expert report on the implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 1973 identifies the UAE, to-
gether with Turkey and Jordan, as the countries which supply different warring parties in Libya with 
equipment and weapons (United Nations Security Council 2019). Again and again, Amnesty Interna-
tional has reported human rights violations such as enforced disappearances of journalists and oppo-
sition members, torture and death penalties. The involvement of the UAE in the war in Yemen, the vio-
lation of UN sanctions in Libya and the human rights violations all concern criteria of the EU Common 
Position; therefore, no arms export licences to the country should actually be granted. Nevertheless, 
in the past years the UAE have repeatedly received licences for small arms and light weapons as well 
as associated ammunition, for armoured howitzers, armoured vehicles, minehunters and parts for 
patrol boats or parts for a combat training centre (Tillack 2019a).12 Since the beginning of the Yemen 
war in 2015, the UAE have received licences worth more than 500 million euros (Bonn International 
Center for Conversion 2020h).
4. regIonal tenSIonS 
Some of the Political Principles have long served as guidelines for decisions on German arms ex-
ports, e.g. not exporting to regions of tension. Criterion Four of the EU Common Position emphasises 
the need to preserve peace, security and stability in the respective recipient region. The User’s Guide 
suggests that the export decision should depend on whether the intended recipient country wants to 
use the military equipment aggressively against another country, to assert a territorial claim by force 
or even just to threaten an aggressive use. This needs to be balanced against the right to self-defence 
enshrined in Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, also the country’s interest to ensure its 
internal security must be taken into account. Thus, the assessment should also consider whether 
there is a clear risk, whether there is a history of armed conflict or trends towards an escalating con-
flict situation can be discerned in the region/neighbourhood (Council of the European Union 2015: 
56–57). For the report, the countries of the Middle East and North Africa have been assessed mainly 
according to Criterion Two (respect for human rights and international humanitarian law) as well as 
Criterion Three (internal situation). However, the Middle East region in particular has been in a con-
stant arms race for decades, with high potential for conflict but also concrete military interventions, 
as Turkey’s invasion of Syria but also the war in Yemen have shown. Here, too, Criterion Four should 
12   Cf. Waffenexporte.org (n.d.): Tabellarische Aufarbeitung der Rüstungsexportberichte der Bundesregierung 2000-1.
HJ 2017. Vereinigte Arabische Emirate, https://www.waffenexporte.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/03/Waffen-Ex_
Vereinigte-Arabische-Emirate.pdf (March22, 2021). 
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supply sufficient grounds to deny licences. Indeed, the German government often refers to Criterion 
Four in denying any export licences. 
The South Asia and Southeast Asia regions are also among the regions with most tensions and 
conflicts. Armed conflicts over the Kashmir region have already erupted three times between India 
and Pakistan since 1947, the last one in 1999. Both sides claim Kashmir as part of their territory; both 
Pakistan and India have nuclear weapons. But even apart from this armed conflict between India and 
Pakistan, tensions in the Kashmir region regularly claim casualties. In 2018 alone, Indian security 
forces killed 76 civilians during violent protests in the Jammu and Kashmir region administered by 
India (Heidelberg Institute for International Conflict Research 2019: 137).
4.1 INDIA
India is among the most important recipient states of German weapons of war and other military 
equipment, and among the largest arms importers worldwide. Between January 2017 and July 2019 
alone, the country received military equipment worth more than 278 million euros from Germany 
(Bundesministerium für Wirtschaft und Energie 2019b). This put India in second place behind Egypt 
among developing countries (Fähnders 2019). In 2019, the Federal Security Council granted an ex-
port licence for 72 Meteor warheads and associated engines; the air-to-air missile is intended for the 
Indian air force. This occurred just when the clashes in the Jammu and Kashmir region administered 
by India saw a renewed violent escalation (Gebauer 2019). Export licences for such crisis regions 
remain highly problematic and should not be granted if the Political Principles and the EU Common 
Position were interpreted accurately.
Even though the German government frequently uses Criterion Four of the EU Common Position 
as a basis for rejections in its reports on exports of military equipment, licenses have been granted 
for exports of weapons of war and military equipment to India, including tanks, warships and, e.g. in 
2012, also small arms and light weapons (Bonn International Center for Conversion 2020d). India is 
viewed as a difficult cooperation partner, as the country is aiming to establish an independent arms 
industry. Accordingly, the German licences are often for supplying parts and components e.g. for sub-
marines, parts for battle tanks or technologies for border security systems. Since 2016, German arms 
manufacturers have increasingly targeted India as a market, also because the German government 
entered into regular intergovernmental consultations with the Indian government, with the dialogue 
on defence between the two countries to be intensified (Presse- und Informationsamt der Bundesr-
egierung 2019: 91). 
Besides the tensions and repeatedly escalating conflicts with neighbouring Pakistan and the vio-
lent escalations in the Jammu and Kashmir region, there are also frequent violent clashes between 
Hindus and Muslims within India (Deutscher Bundestag 2019a). Amnesty International reports seri-
ous human rights violations in India itself, with armed forces and police alleged to be involved e.g. in 
extrajudicial executions (Amnesty International 2020). It appears all the more problematic that the 
German government has nevertheless repeatedly granted licences for machine guns and subma-
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chine guns (Gemeinsame Konferenz Kirche und Entwicklung 2016b: 52). The case of Mexico shows 
that small arms and light weapons in particular often end up in the regions of a country where gov-
ernment security forces disregard the rule of law.13
4.2 PAKISTAN
Pakistan is also among the largest arms importers worldwide. In the conflict with India over Kashmir, 
both sides are continually building up arms. Amnesty International reports a variety of human rights 
violations in Pakistan (Amnesty International 2017). In addition, there are various internal conflicts 
in Pakistan, including between Islamist groupings and the government, but also religious conflicts 
between Sunni and Shi’a. These conflicts are often fuelled by the uncontrolled proliferation of small 
arms and light weapons that reach Pakistan from neighbouring Afghanistan. Moreover, Pakistan 
was deemed a Taliban safe haven after September 11, 2001. In December 2014, the Pakistani part of 
the Taliban claimed responsibility for a massive terrorist attack on an army school in Peshawar that 
killed more than 150 people, including 130 school children.14 In summary, this shows that the coun-
try is not only involved in a constantly simmering regional conflict with neighbouring India, but the 
internal situation of the country is also extremely unstable. Thus, according to the criteria of the EU 
Common Position, there would be multiple criteria that preclude arms exports to Pakistan.
Among other things, the country received missiles and parts for torpedoes, engines for helicop-
ters and parts for combat aircraft from Germany. Between January 1, 2017 and July 2019 alone, the 
German government granted licences for Pakistan amounting to 247 million euros (Bonn Interna-
tional Center for Conversion 2020e. In 2018, the government granted licences for military equipment 
worth about 174 million euros, including for maritime patrol aircraft, torpedo bombers, aircraft, he-
licopters, communication equipment and radar reconnaissance systems as well as underwater de-
tection devices. Pakistan was thus among the top ten most important recipient countries of German 
arms exports (Bundesministerium für Wirtschaft und Energie 2019a: 73). 
4.3 ISRAEL
Every German government has emphasised Germany’s unique historical responsibility for Israel’s 
security; it is part of Germany’s raison d’état as a result of Nazi terror and the Holocaust (Die Bundes-
regierung 2008; Kaim 2015). And yet Israel lies in the midst of the region of tension in the Middle East 
and is in perpetual conflict with Arab states and Iran, not least about the recognition of the State of 
Israel. At the core of the Middle East conflict lies another conflict which is the Israeli-Palestinian con-
flict. The example of Israel makes the dilemma between the country’s right to self-defence according 
13  See the case of Mexico in Chapter 5.
14  Cf. Bonn International Center for Conversion (2020e): Pakistan Informationsdienst Sicherheit, Rüstung und Entwick-
lung in Empfängerländern deutscher Rüstungsexporte, BICC\LÄNDERBERICHT 12, http://www.ruestungsexport.info/
user/pages/04.laenderberichte/pakistan/2020_Pakistan.pdf (March 22, 2021).
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to Article 51 of the UN Charter and the risk of arms exports contributing to a violent escalation of 
existing conflicts and an actual use of these weapons particularly clear. For example, in 2019 Israel 
attacked Iranian positions in Syria (Zeit Online 2019). In 2006, Israel responded to the sustained mis-
sile fire from the Shi’ite Hezbollah militia with a five-week war in Lebanon (Der Spiegel 2006).
The German understanding of Germany’s historically rooted responsibility for Israel’s security 
was already expressed in the 1950s, when German companies started supplying Israel with military 
equipment. The arms cooperation between the two countries intensified over time. In 1965, Arab 
states threatened to break off diplomatic relations over the German arms shipments. As a result, Ger-
many planned to no longer supply weapons of war to the various parties and to apply the principle of 
equal treatment to other military equipment (Wissenschaftliche Dienste Deutscher Bundestag 2007). 
However, in the case of Israel a lasting arms cooperation continued without ever being formalised 
contractually. For example, since the 1980s the Israeli battle tank Merkava has used the same tech-
nology as the German Leopard 2 tank. The Merkava tank was employed in 2006 in the Lebanon con-
flict (Nassauer 2006).
In the first half of the 1990s, the German government granted licences for three submarines of 
the Dolphin class; they were shipped in 1999 and 2000 (Nassauer 2011). Licences for three further 
submarines had been granted by 2012. The budget for 2012 included 135 million euros for funding 
the submarines to cover about a third of the total cost of 400 million euros (Nassauer 2012a). The de-
cision in favour of the submarines was taken with the knowledge that Israel could arm the warships 
with nuclear weapons and Germany could thus contribute to Israeli nuclear deterrence. However, 
Israel has never confirmed its status as a nuclear power. Germany, by contrast, is a party to the 1968 
nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and is thus undermining the credibility of its own status and 
conduct as a non-nuclear-weapon state.
Besides such exports of weapons of war, a number of Israeli major weapons systems also con-
tain German components, for example speedboats, corvettes or the Merkava tank (Nassauer 2010). 
Manufacturing know-how for the German Panzerfaust 3 launcher was passed on to Israel. In partic-
ular, the arms cooperation between Germany and Israel has intensified over the last three decades, 
though information about it remains highly classified (Nassauer/Steinmetz 2003). The cooperation 
between the two states is said to extend e.g. to the area of research, development and testing of 
weapons systems (Nassauer/Pallade/Steinmetz 2002). The above examples show that Germany 
also passes technology on to Israel which is then incorporated into Israeli arms projects.
5. the rISk of IllICIt dIverSIon of Small armS and lIght    
 weaponS
In Criterion Seven, the EU Common Position emphasises the risk that military technology or equip-
ment will be diverted within the buyer country or re-exported. Small arms and light weapons are par-
ticularly relevant to proliferation. By their nature, they are easy to transport, smuggle and pass on. 
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Legal small arms in state hands often end up in illegal circulation due to insufficiently secure storage, 
as the examples of German arms export policy of the past document.
5.1 AFGHANISTAN
Germany took part in rebuilding Afghanistan in the framework of the multinational ISAF mission with 
soldiers and equipment aid. Thus, licences for weapons of war and military equipment were granted 
after the UN weapons embargo ended in 2001. For instance, in 2005 and 2007 licences were granted 
for small arms, including 10,000 decommissioned pistols to the Afghan security forces from German 
military stockpiles. Some of these pistols appeared on Afghan and Pakistani black markets (Der 
Spiegel 2009). 
5.2 GEORGIA
In summer 2008, illegally supplied G36 assault rifles surfaced in the Russo-Georgian War (Der Spie-
gel 2008). The German government had at no time granted licences for these assault rifles, but 
had rather denied a concrete application of the Georgian government for 230 G36 assault rifles 
(Deutscher Bundestag 2008). The suspicion therefore arose that these weapons came from an un-
licensed retransfer. The German government could presumably have identified the country of origin 
based on the serial numbers. However, the matter was never resolved, despite parliamentary inqui-
ries. According to unconfirmed sources, the weapons may have originated from licences and exports 
to the United States of America (Deckert 2008). 
5.3 COLOMBIA
More than 38,000 pistols and firearms of the company Sig Sauer are said to have reached Colombia, 
a country torn by civil war, via the U.S. between 2009 and 2012; no licences had been granted for this 
by the German government (Nassauer 2014). In 2019, the illegal retransfer from the U.S. to Colombia 
led to a trial in the Landgericht (regional court) in Kiel. An executive of the company with U.S. citizen-
ship was arrested during a stopover at Frankfurt Airport and was remanded in custody. The company 
Sig Sauer had deliberately circumvented the export ban and had declared the firearms as an export 
to the U.S. From there the weapons were directly shipped on to Colombia. The trial in Kiel ended with 
a plea deal already on the second day. In return for a comprehensive admission of guilt, the three de-
fendants would have received suspended sentences, and Sig Sauer’s entire gross revenue of about 
eleven million euros would have been confiscated. The defendants ultimately did not accept this deal 
after all but rather appealed the decision, so that this case will have to be decided by the Federal 
Court of Justice in Karlsruhe (Gemeinsame Konferenz Kirche und Entwicklung 2019: 68–70). 
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5.4 LIBYA
In 2011, rebels storming a residency of Muammar Gaddafi in Tripoli obtained G36 assault rifles al-
leged to have been in the country since 2005. The German government had not granted a correspond-
ing export licence. Upon request, the company Heckler & Koch stated that the assault rifles appeared 
to have come from an export to Egypt and to have reached the Libyan dictator from there. However, 
the case was never really resolved, which was presumably also due to the insufficient marking of 
these weapons, which had systematically been obliterated from the polymer frame (Grässlin 2012). 
5.5 MEXICO
In summer 2006, the Federal Security Council granted licences for the export of the first tranche of 
G36 assault rifles to Mexico. However, a specific condition was attached: Heckler & Koch was not 
allowed to ship the assault rifles to the four troubled provinces of Chiapas, Chihuahua, Guerrero and 
Jalisco. Until 2009, the German government granted licences for further shipments of G36 assault ri-
fles to equip the Mexican police; in total, up to 9,000 are said to have been delivered. Already in 2007, 
Heckler & Koch obtained follow-up orders for spare parts, also amounting to millions of euros. In that 
context, officials in the Office for Export Control (Bundesausfuhramt, BAFA) in Eschborn responsible 
for the licences noticed discrepancies in the company’s end-use certificates, as the spare parts were 
also to be shipped to the four troubled provinces, to which the assault rifles should never have been 
sent in the first place (Grässlin 2011). Already in 2006, Amnesty International decried numerous cas-
es of misuse of weapons by the Mexican police against opposition members. Moreover, the police 
repeatedly used armed force against protesters. 
On September 26, 2014, the police in Iguala in the state of Guerrero shot at busses with student 
protesters inside, killing six students. They then encircled a group of students, whom the police sub-
sequently handed over to a criminal gang. 43 of these students were missing for a long time, until 
traces of their DNA were discovered in a mass grave. The Mexican investigators had also seized G36 
assault rifles upon arresting police officers. A projectile from a G36 was found in one of the surviving 
Mexican students, who has been in a coma since. The evidence was sufficient for the Landgericht in 
Stuttgart to order 3.6 million euros of Heckler & Koch’s revenue from illegal exports of small arms to 
be confiscated. The company’s appeal is currently still pending before the Federal Court of Justice 
in Karlsruhe (Gemeinsame Konferenz Kirche und Entwicklung 2018: 96–99; 2019: 68–70). However, 
the Landgericht in Stuttgart rejected the application of Mexican relatives of the 43 disappeared stu-
dents to join the court case. In 2015, the German public broadcaster ARD dedicated a theme night to 
this scandal of German arms export policy, with a feature film and a documentary seen by about four 
million TV viewers.15 The members of the German parliament also dealt with the case of Mexico as a 
current issue in a parliamentary debate (Deutscher Bundestag 2015c).




The situation seemed dramatic and required immediate political action. In 2014, more than 20,000 
Yazidis had sought refuge in the Sinjar Mountains in northern Iraq. As a religious minority, they were 
directly exposed to the IS terror and were in mortal danger. In this exceptional situation, the German 
government decided to supply the Kurdish Peshmerga in northern Iraq with used weapons, ammuni-
tion and equipment from German military stockpiles so that they could liberate the encircled Yazidis. 
In fact, the Yazidis were liberated by fighters of militias associated with the PKK, which is acknowl-
edged as a terrorist group in Germany. Beginning in February 2015, the German government decided 
to ship further weapons and ammunition. There was no longer any talk of an emergency, an excep-
tional situation and the need to prevent crimes against humanity by all available means. Rather, the 
justification for the new tranches of weapons and ammunition from German military stockpiles was 
now that the Iraqi-Kurdish regional government had to be supported in the fight against the terror of 
the Islamic State (Gemeinsame Konferenz Kirche und Entwicklung 2016a: 114–124). 
German media repeatedly reported on the human rights violations committed by security forces 
of the Kurdish regional government against government critics. Critical journalists are also said to 
have been killed (Deutscher Bundestag 2015a). Moreover, up to 80 small arms and light weapons 
from German military stockpiles are said to have appeared on the black markets in Erbil, as the 
stocks were apparently insufficiently secured (Norddeutscher Rundfunk 2016). The situation further 
escalated when the Kurds in northern Iraq voted in favour of their independence in a referendum in 
September 2017 and included areas they had occupied since 2014, such as the city of Kirkuk and the 
oil-rich region nearby (Gehlen 2017). The independence referendum and the territorial expansion of 
the Kurds in northern Iraq prompted the Iraqi central government to take military action in and around 
Kirkuk. The Kurdish Peshmerga employed Milan anti-tank missiles in combat situations that they had 
received from Germany (Deutsche Welle 2017). This case, too, illustrates the special risk from arms 
exports and military aid, both of which can easily contribute to the uncontrolled and illicit proliferation 
of small arms and light weapons.
6. armS CooperatIon, teChnology tranSfer and SubSIdIarIeS In   
 thIrd CountrIeS
Two trends can be discerned in German arms export policy that also lead to weapons of war and 
military equipment ending up in controversial third countries: The Europeanisation and the interna-
tionalisation of arms production. Joint arms productions with EU/NATO states should be unproblem-
atic in principle, but for instance the European cooperation with France and the UK illustrates that 
military equipment from such joint projects can also be supplied to controversial third countries such 
as Saudi Arabia. In principle, the criteria of the 2008 EU Common Position also apply to France and 
applied to the UK until it left the EU in January 2020. But the UK supplied combat jets of the Eurofight-
er Typhoon type to Saudi Arabia despite the fact that the recipient state used the combat jets in the 
Yemen war (Chapman 2019). The companies Airbus and MTU Friedrichshafen are also involved in 
manufacturing this combat jet. Examples from the past also show that German arms manufacturers 
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use foreign partners, subsidiaries or licensed production in order to circumvent possible denials of 
German licences. For instance, G3 assault rifles from British licensed production were supplied to 
Serbia in the early 1990s and were employed in the Bosnian War (Kelsey/Van Beveren 1993). 
The example of the manufacturing and transfer of ammunition in the case of the company Rhein-
metall illustrates a growing trend towards the internationalisation of arms production (Nassauer 
2016). The company has been buying and modernising ammunition manufacturers abroad for quite 
some time. Rheinmetall Denel South Africa built an entire ammunition factory in Saudi Arabia (Welt 
2016). Such subsidiaries and joint ventures have repeatedly supplied munition to controversial third 
countries. For instance, RWM Italia supplied MK bombs to Saudi Arabia, which were also used in the 
Yemen war. On October 8, 2016, six civilians were killed in their house in an air strike of the Yemen war 
coalition, even though there was no strategic military objective nearby (Trial International 2019). The 
bomb fragments recovered originated in RWM Italia’s production. In April 2018, four non-governmen-
tal organisations filed a criminal complaint with the public prosecutor’s office in Rome.16
Until 2019, Rheinmetall explored plans to potentially form a joint venture with the Turkish Partner 
BMC for building a tank factory. Upgrading the Leopard tanks supplied by Germany was going to be 
a key initial project. But in addition, personnel were to be found and trained in order to produce battle 
tanks in Turkey in the future (Tillack 2018a). However, in the meantime the plans have been reduced 
to a potential upgrade of up to 350 Leopard tanks. Rheinmetall no longer appears to be considering 
the arms cooperation for building a tank factory (Handelsblatt 2017). By contrast, licences have been 
granted for German technology, components and warheads of the company TDW to be used to de-
velop and remodel Turkish warheads for anti-tank guided missiles. On the basis of TDW’s technology, 
the Turkish arms manufacturer Roketsan is also producing the MAML-L warhead, which is deemed 
the standard weapon for Turkish drones. These drones were used against the PKK and in attacks vi-
olating international humanitarian law in the Syrian province of Idlib (Monitor 2020). 
These examples of arms cooperations, of establishing subsidiaries in third countries and of trans-
fer of German technology and know-how reveal vast regulatory gaps in German arms export legisla-
tion and the associated procedures. These relate to the export of technical support and know-how 
as well as the possibility to monitor investments of German arms manufacturers in building foreign 
production capacities. These regulatory gaps have still not been closed even after the revision of the 
Political Principles in July 2019 (GKKE-Fachgruppe Rüstungsexporte 2019: 7).
16   The four non-governmental organisations include the European Center for Constitutional and Human Rights 
(ECCHR), the Yemeni organisation Mwatana for Human Rights as well as Rete Italiana per Il Disarmo. See also 
GKKE-Fachgruppe Rüstungsexporte 2019: GKKE-Rüstungsexportbericht 2019, Bonn/Berlin. 89–93.
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7. ConCluSIonS: the patternS of german armS export polICy
The review of 30 years of German arms export policy illustrates that German arms export control 
consists of a variety of rules, norms and procedures. These were modified and adapted over the de-
cades, and were additionally complemented by European rules such as the EU Common Position and 
by international treaties such as the Arms Trade Treaty. Despite this dense but also complicated web 
of norms, weapons of war and military equipment reached and are still reaching controversial third 
countries, not least because sanctioning powers do not exist at the European and international level 
and are very limited in Germany, too. If the criteria of the EU Common Position are taken as a basis 
for assessing 30 years of German arms export policy, then Germany has repeatedly violated many 
of these criteria.
The German Political Principles for the Export of Weapons of war and other Military Equipment 
emphasise that arms exports to third countries are to be handled restrictively. Licences for export-
ing weapons of war are not granted unless particular foreign and security policy interests or alliance 
commitments speak in favour. These principles require a principled justification of such foreign and 
security policy interests. Despite the principle of peace in Article 26 para. 1 of the constitution, Ger-
many exports weapons of war and military equipment to problematic third countries. Arms exports 
to third countries from Germany have become the rule rather than the exception: in several of the 
past ten years, 60 per cent of German weapons of war and military equipment went to third countries. 
This report documents three kinds of cases: 1. weapons of war and military equipment reach 
problematic third countries but are not immediately used; 2. weapons of war and military equipment 
reach countries that wage war with German weapons, or countries that apply insufficient controls to 
these weapons, so that these weapons end up on the black market and are employed in a conflict in 
a neighbouring country; 3. weapons of war, military equipment but also technologies, know-how or 
licences are given to third countries or to NATO countries, which retransfer the weapons from there 
or produce weapons of war with German technology and sell them to warring parties. German arms 
export policy is shaped by an interplay of licences, denials and the suspension of licence decisions. 
The cases of Saudi Arabia and Turkey are almost paradigmatic for Germany’s indecisive and con-
tradictory arms export policy. Arms cooperations with other EU countries, such as in the case of the 
Eurofighter Typhoon, are a further option for how German supplies and components in weapons of 
war and military equipment can end up in controversial third countries. The risk of retransfer and of 
undesirable diversion is particularly high for exports of small and light weapons, as documented in 
Chapter 4. 
Germany grants licences for and transfers weapons of war and military equipment to countries 
waging war, to countries with human rights violations and to regions of tension. Here in particular, 
German arms exports fuel arms races and thus increase the risk that existing conflicts escalate and 
turn violent. The countries of the MENA region remain the most important recipients of German arms 
exports, but South(east) Asia and South America also have been and still are recipient countries of 
German military equipment. A war has been raging in Yemen since 2015, and the civilian population 
is suffering most. The air strikes against civilian targets by members of the Yemen war coalition and 
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the naval blockades violate central criteria of international humanitarian law, such as those of propor-
tionality and of distinction between civilians und combatants (Wisotzki 2018). Some of the weapons 
of war and military equipment employed in the Yemen conflict origin from Germany.
In the past, Germany has repeatedly exported small arms and light weapons to third countries, in-
cluding from decommissioned stockpiles of the German military. In July 2019, in revising the Political 
Principles for the Export of Weapons of war and other Military Equipment, the German government 
decided in principle not to grant licences for small arms and light weapons to be exported to third 
countries. To which extent the formulation in principle will be interpreted in the form of exceptions 
after all will only become apparent in the practice of German arms exports in the coming years. The 
2019 report on exports of military equipment documents that the arms transfers to third countries 
have decreased considerably, but still in 2019 e.g. licences were granted for 45 parts for submachine 
guns to be exported to the United Arab Emirates. The report’s examples document how quickly arms 
exports and equipment aid such as small arms and light weapons enter into illegal circulation and 
end up on the black market. Worldwide, more small arms and light weapons are still being produced 
than are currently being destroyed (Alwardt et al. 2019: 103). A serious regulatory gap remains with 
respect to ammunition, as weapons only turn deadly once they are loaded with ammunition. The re-
vised Political Principles of July 2019 have so far disregarded the subject of ammunition.
But ammunition is relevant not only to the functioning of small arms and light weapons, but is 
also relevant for armies, navies and air forces, for instance in the form of ammunition for tanks, how-
itzers, artillery weapons or for naval guns. Especially the production of ammunition brings a further 
pattern of German arms export policy into focus, namely the growing trend towards the internation-
alisation of German arms manufacturers. Joint ventures such as the one formed by the company 
Rheinmetall, which established a new site in South Africa in acquiring Denel, aim to provide the coun-
tries of the MENA region, Latin America and South(east) Asia that are prone to conflicts and tensions 
with ammunition. Bombs from the company RWM Italia were employed in the Yemen conflict and 
killed a family of six. The regulatory gaps in the procedures of German arms export policy regarding 
the transfer of technology and know-how as well as investments of German arms manufacturers in 
foreign companies need to be closed. 
This could be achieved by passing an arms export control law that could turn the vast and grow-
ing web of norms and regulations in German arms export policy into a unified and legally binding law 
(Gemeinsame Konferenz Kirche und Entwicklung 2016b: 94–107). Already in the run-up to the federal 
election year 2021, several parliamentary groups in the German parliament have spoken out in favour 
of such an arms export control law, including Bündnis 90/Die Grünen, the SPD and DIE LINKE. The 
idea itself is not new and was already pursued in the previous legislative period of the Grand Coali-
tion by the Minister for Economic Affairs, Sigmar Gabriel. A consultation process between different 
stakeholders from politics, business, academia and civil society was organised at the time but did 
not result in any meaningful outcome. In the meantime, however, legal experts have prepared drafts 
of what such an arms export control law could look like (Greenpeace 2020; GKKE 2016). Such a 
law could create a basis for judicial review and serve as an instrument of increased accountability. 
Together with the right of eligible associations such as non-governmental organisations to sue the 
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government for problematic arms exports to third countries, this would make arms export control 
subject to better control, in addition to the still limited possibilities of political scrutiny. (Gemeinsame 
Konferenz Kirche und Entwicklung 2021: 67). Arms exports have a long life span: the examples of 
this study illustrate that past exports can have dramatic repercussions even many years later if the 
political situation in the recipient state changes such that the weapons supplied from Germany are 
used in war, to violently crush protest movements or to violate international humanitarian law and 
human rights.
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